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Introduction 
By definition, the cold war was understood on both sides of the conflict to be a 
global struggle that stopped short of direct military engagement between the 
superpowers (the U.S. and the USSR). In Europe, the putative center of that struggle, 
the geopolitical battle lines were fixed after the early 1950s, or they at least could not 
be altered by normal military means without provoking World War III-which 
would result in mutual annihilation. Therefore, each side hoped to make gains over 
the other by using more subtle, political, and often clandestine methods, winning the 
"hearts and minds" of people in the other bloc (as well as maintaining potentially 
wayward support in one's own bloc), hoping to subvert the other side from within. 
The cold war was an enormous campaign of propaganda and psychological warfare on 
both sides. A vast range of cultural resources, from propaganda posters and radio 
broadcasts to sophisticated literary magazines, jazz bands, ballet troupes, and 
symphony orchestras, were weapons in what has recently come to be called the 
"Cultural Cold War" (Saunders 1999). Studies of the cultural cold war have 
proliferated since the late 1990s, most of which focus on U.S. cultural policy and are 
concerned with the European "theater" of this conflict (Hixson 1997; Fehrenbach and 
Poiger 2000; Poiger 2000; Berghahn 2001). East Asia, where the cold war was 
"hotter" than any other place on the planet from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s and 
where vestiges of the cold war still linger (most notably on the Korean peninsula), 
has been almost entirely neglected in the emerging literature on the cultural cold 
war, with the exception of a few works on the U.S. occupation of Japan (Fehrenbach 
and Poiger 2000, 45-80, 166-86, 224-36; Dower 1999; Sandler 1997) and studies 
of intelligence and "special operations" (Aldrich, Rawnsley, and Rawnsley 2000). 
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The East Asian experience of the cultural cold war, like other aspects of that 
global conflict, was in many ways quite different from that in Europe. First, East Asia 
between 1950 and 1975 was the site of actual military conflict involving major cold 
war protagonists, especially the United States and-although sometimes indirectly- 
the People's Republic of China (in Korea, Vietnam, and in a more limited fashion 
the Taiwan Straits). This meant that, although more combat resources were applied 
to this region, the cultural conflict was often cruder and less primary than in Europe, 
sometimes taking the form of simple wartime propaganda methods that bordered on 
the ludicrous, such as "loudspeaker wars," which broadcasted propaganda across the 
Korean Demilitarized Zone. Second, despite the open nature of cold war conflict in 
East Asia, the leaders of the U.S. and USSR always saw Europe as the center of their 
struggle and consequently put their best cultural resources into this region. Finding 
an East Asian equivalent of a writer the stature of Arthur Koestler or of a magazine 
as sophisticated as Encounter backed by the CIA in order to fight the cultural cold war 
in the West is difficult. Third, because of the collapse of the Eastern bloc in Europe, 
sources on both sides of the cold war are now accessible to scholars (although as yet 
little work has been done on the Soviet side of the cultural cold war). This is not the 
case for East Asia, where access to relevant Chinese sources, to say nothing of North 
Korean and Vietnamese sources, is still quite limited and where "our" side remains 
somewhat reticent, as well. The cold war in East Asia is still seen by most scholars 
overwhelmingly in terms of military, political, and, to a lesser extent, economic 
conflict.' As I will argue below, however, the cultural arena broadly conceived-from 
the realms of arts and letters to that of mass media and popular education-was the 
site of an intense political struggle in East Asia. This struggle was deeply implicated 
in the cold war that emerged in the late 1940s. Perhaps nowhere was this more the 
case than in Korea, the only country in East Asia occupied by both the U.S. and USSR 
after World War II, where the emerging superpower conflict imposed itself on a 
postcolonial society with far-reaching consequences, creating or deepening a political 
polarization that would profoundly affect and become inseparably linked to the world 
of cultural production. Such polarization was part of the conflict that became the 
Korean War and would long outlast the cold war itself. 
This article is concerned with the origins of that postwar political polarization in 
the Korean cultural arena. The main focus is on the U.S. occupation authorities and 
the Korean cultural producers-educators, writers, artists, musicians, filmmakers, and 
so on-who worked for or against the authorities. Due to a lack of data at this point, 
I will not be able to evaluate how culture and propaganda were received by ordinary 
Koreans, although there were certainly many opinions among the U.S. occupation 
authorities about how Koreans would and did respond to the cultural-political 
struggle going on around them. Although I will spend some time discussing cultural 
activities in the Soviet zone north of the thirty-eighth parallel, my primary concern 
is with American cultural policy in South Korea up to the early stages of the Korean 
War, ending with the U.S.-UN-Republic of Korea (ROK) recapture of most of the 
'Nevertheless, much groundbreaking work has been done in East Asian cold war history, 
especially on the Chinese side (see, for example, Zhang 1995, 2001; Zhai 2000; Chen 2001). To my knowledge, however, none of the recent "cold war history" literature on East Asia has 
directly addressed the issue of culture; its emphasis on a relatively narrow range of political 
concerns, mostly at the level of the top leadership (osef Stalin and Mao Zedong, in particular), 
makes this literature strikingly different from much of the recent work on the cold war in 
Europe. 
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peninsula in late fall 1950.2 Consequently I will not be able to go into the post- 
Korean War period, which saw perhaps for the first time the significant penetration 
of American culture into (South) Korean society. It is only after the Korean War, I 
would argue, that a real "reorientation" (in the contemporary American occupation 
lingo) of Korean society and culture can be seen in which the U.S. played an enormous 
role as both a model and instigator of cultural change.3 From the American 
perspective, the period from 1945 to 1950 was largely a time of lost opportunities, 
frustrations, and a growing sense that the U.S. was losing the cultural cold war in 
Korea to the communists. The Korean War would permanently alter the American 
perception of the terms and importance of this struggle for the "hearts and minds" 
of the people, both in Korea and elsewhere in East Asia. 
Korea, American Occupation, and the Cold War 
Korea is a peculiar case in U.S. post-World War II occupation policy. In theory 
a liberated country, South Korea (the American zone south of the thirty-eighth 
parallel) was treated by the U.S. more like an occupied enemy country (Cumings 
1981). The most prominent aspect of the U.S. attitude toward Korea in the initial 
year or two of occupation, however, was neglect. In addition, if the occupation of 
Korea was an afterthought of U.S. military planners, then culture was an afterthought 
of an afterthought.4 The United States Army Military Government in Korea 
(USAMGIK) neither had a clear cultural policy nor paid much attention to cultural 
matters in South Korea until fears of communist subversion arose in the latter part 
of 1946, when the USAMGIK belatedly recognized it had a public relations problem 
in Korea. Even then, the Americans paid little attention to intellectuals and the 
Korean cultural world as such but finally began to put efforts into promoting a positive 
image of the U.S. within Korea, utilizing both American and Korean resources. By 
1947 the USAMGIK began to fear losing ground in the propaganda war against the 
Soviets and started a more proactive propaganda campaign of its own, which the U.S. 
2For a more extensive treatment of North Korea in the immediate postliberation years, 
see Armstrong 2003. 
3One of the crucial elements of U.S. cultural policy in the post-Korean War years was 
the active collaboration between U.S. government agencies and private foundations in cultural 
activities abroad. U.S.-based foundations uch as Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie played major 
roles in promoting American cultural exchange with postwar Europe (Berghahn 2001). In 
Asia, perhaps the most important American private organization cultivating "local talent" (as 
opposed to merely bringing in American artists and cultural products) from the mid-1950s 
to the mid-1960s was the Asia Foundation, established as the Committee for Free Asia in San 
Francisco in 1951. In post-Korean War South Korea, the Asia Foundation supported, among 
other projects, the leading literary magazine Sasangye, art and literature prizes, and movie 
production. 
4In the U.S. occupation of Germany, on the other hand, control of the cultural apparatuses 
(publication, broadcasting, etc.) and support among the intellectuals were much greater con- 
cerns, although hardly the most important aspects of occupation policy (see Schivelbusch 
1998). American occupation planners had a similar concern in Japan (Dower 1999); in both 
cases, "reorientation" away from Nazism and militarism, respectively, meant transforming 
political, social, and economic structures and institutions in the occupied countries, as well as 
altering the mindsets of the local people. For the latter, of course, censorship and manipulation 
of cultural production were essential. As we shall see, "reorientation" in Korea was not an 
active U.S. policy until the Korean War. 
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was conducting not only in Korea and other "front-line states" in the emerging cold 
war but also around the world. This was the point at which Korea became part of the 
global cold war. 
The Korean War was a turning point in the cultural cold war globally, as well 
as in Korea itself. What makes the Korean case distinctive is that the Korean War 
was not just a direct military conflict but also the only instance throughout the cold 
war period of "rollback" in action, that is, the military occupation of a communist 
territory by anticommunist forces led by the United States. The planners of the three- 
month U.S.-UN-ROK occupation of North Korea envisioned, but never put 
completely into practice, a program of "reorientation" of the North Korean population 
away from communism and toward American-style democracy. This was the only case 
in history in which an American occupation of a defeated enemy country was combined 
with what might be called "de-communization," analogous to "de-Nazification" in 
Germany and de-militarization in Japan. As such, the occupation of North Korea not 
only stands as a useful microcosm of cold war history but is also a suggestive and 
unique example of American anticommunist (or, rather, postcommunist) cultural 
policy in action; it possibly even affords some insight into a future united Korea, 
should the peninsula be unified on South Korean terms, although it certainly must 
be kept in mind that both South and North Korea now are very different places from 
what they were half a century ago. 
We can trace roughly three stages in U.S. cultural policy toward Korea between 
the Japanese surrender and the Korean War: a period of apathy, from August 1945 
to the end of 1946; alienation, in which a growing number of intellectuals became 
disillusioned with the U.S. occupation and moved north to the Soviet zone, from early 
1946 to mid-1947; and activism, with the U.S. occupiers finally paying serious 
attention to the problems of propaganda and information, from mid-1947 to 1950. 
This late-1940s change of direction is of course directly linked to the emergence of 
the U.S.-Soviet cold war, and in this process the U.S. authorities in Korea-as well 
as elsewhere along the cold war front-expressed a growing concern with, and then 
a kind of faith in, the malleability of the human mind to propaganda and indoctri- 
nation in this global struggle. An important underlying assumption of the U.S. 
propaganda offensive from 1947 onward, and especially in the Korean War, is that 
communists, and Asian communists in particular, had a peculiar talent for indoctri- 
nation (what became popularly known through the Korean War as "brainwashing"),5 
to which a society with a large and unsophisticated agrarian population such as Korea 
was unusually susceptible and which had to be countered with a vigorous indoctri- 
nation and education campaign on the American side. Although literature, theater, 
and other cultural media were important means of disseminating pro-Western 
propaganda, film was the medium par excellence which was thought to be most effective 
in the propaganda war. Film as propaganda was widely, and often thought quite 
effectively, used in World War II--notably in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union 
(Taylor 1998), but Americans were no pikers in this regard. The films in Frank Capra's 
Why We Fight film series for U.S. military personnel were small masterpieces of the 
fusion of art and propaganda. As a reaction to the sophisticated use of film as 
propaganda on the communist side, the U.S. information policy put its energies and 
resources into the production and dissemination of politically oriented films, primarily 
documentaries, from 1948 onward. 
5The term "brainwashing" was first popularized in the English-speaking world during the Korean War by Edward Hester's (1951) book Brainwashing in Red China (Gleason 1995, 92). 
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Education and Intellectuals in the Early 
Occupation Period, 1945-46 
From the vantage point of the Korean War, the U.S. military looked back on the 
1945-48 occupation of South Korea with considerable self-criticism. In 1950, the 
U.S. Army acknowledged that the first year and a half of the occupation was "not 
productive in the field of reorientation" (National Archives, RG 319a, 10). U.S. 
cultural policy in Korea was quite unclear before the Korean War, with the partial 
exception of education, for which the military government (MG) had a rather 
consistent, if somewhat ill-conceived, policy. Schools in Korea had been closed since 
the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, and one of the MG's first priorities was 
to reopen the schools. As the MG later admitted, however, "American education 
personnel were all but totally ignorant of Korean educational conditions," relying on 
missionaries and especially the Japanese for information (Occupation, 1). On 10 
September, an education officer was sent from Okinawa; he read everything he knew 
about Korea in the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Service (JANIS) report on the boat 
to Inchon. After briefings from Japanese and Korean officials of the colonial 
Department of Education, the MG education officer met with sixteen "eminent 
Koreans" in the field of education on 16 September and out of this group founded a 
seven-member Korean Committee on Education (Occupation, 15). 
The MG's General Order No. 4 called for all public elementary schools to be 
reopened by 24 September 1945 and private schools to be reopened with the 
permission of the American authorities. In a rather quaintly Americanized language, 
the order proclaimed that there would be "no racial or religious discrimination" in 
schools, the language of instruction would be Korean, and "teaching of no subject 
and observance of no practice inimical to Korea" would be allowed (SKIG 1947, 4). 
In practice, however, the MG maintained the Japanese system and retained Japanese 
administrators when schools were reopened 24 September (Occupation, 16). The 
ultimate goal of the U.S. planners was an education system fully staffed by Koreans 
but structured along American lines. 
Education would be a much more problematic area than the occupation planners 
had anticipated. The MG was faced with the "bewildering restlessness of student 
bodies and faculty members during [the] first two years of occupation," especially 
student and faculty strikes, which were a frequent occurrence until 1948 (Occupation, 
2). The MG sarcastically noted that "exuberance over the Japanese surrender has led 
students into assuming [that} freedom means student control of a school" (SKIG 1947, 
6). Some of the MG's problems stemmed from the poverty and economic dislocation 
of postliberation Korea, in which textbooks were almost nonexistent and educational 
facilities deplorable; some arose out of the political and personal disputes that emerged 
in the schools, the most important being left-right conflicts and accusations of 
collaboration with the Japanese. Some of the problems were clearly of the MG's own 
making, a result of its ignorance and insensitivity. 
One notable example of this insensitivity was the use of school buildings for 
billeting occupation personnel. General John R. Hodge, commander of U.S. 
occupation forces, prohibited this on 29 September, but his prohibition was not widely 
circulated or enforced. When the U.S. Army's Twenty-ninth General Hospital first 
moved into Ewha Women's University, Ewha President Helen Kim (Kim Hwal-lan) 
protested, and the hospital was moved to the scientific school at Keijo Imperial 
University, destroying many faculty papers and a great deal of scientific equipment 
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in the process. The hospital remained on campus until fall 1948, by which time Keijo 
Imperial had been remade into Seoul National University (SKIG 1947, 8). 
The restructuring of elementary and secondary education along American lines 
went relatively smoothly. The area of higher education was where the U.S. military 
government faced its greatest difficulties. Strikes by both students and professors 
recurred throughout the first two years of occupation, the largest and most violent 
being the Seoul National University strike that began in late 1946. The SNU strike 
began over the proposed merger in accordance with USAMGIK Ordinance No. 102 
of ten colleges in Seoul into one university, which was strongly opposed by students 
and faculty. After the formal merger in August 1946, trouble began with registration 
in October for fall semester. Student unrest reflected their opposition to the 
resignation or dismissal of left-wing professors, as well as the merger itself (Ch'oe 
1988, 20). 
Some attempt was made to encourage U.S.-Korean education training and 
exchange, but this had not gone very far before the Korean War. By 1949, just over 
one hundred Koreans were studying in the U.S. on government scholarships, in 
contrast to some six hundred in the USSR. The U.S. set up a teacher training center 
in early 1948 with twenty educators from the U.S. and a student body of some eight 
hundred Korean teachers (Occupation, 112). The U.S.-sponsored English Language 
Institute, founded in 1946, was renamed the American Language Institute in January 
1947. The USAMGIK's long-term plans included the compilation of English- 
language textbooks, the establishment of a language clinic, and the creation of an 
American cultural center "where East and West may amicably meet" (Occupation, 
122). The Fulbright program, established by Congress in 1946 for promoting cultural 
exchange between the U.S. and foreign countries, set up an office in Seoul in April 
1950. The Korean War delayed the Fulbright program in Korea for the next several 
years. Not until well after the war ended did educational exchange between the U.S. 
and South Korea reach the level of exchange between the Soviet Union and North 
Korea in the late 1940s. 
U.S. Cultural Policy and Its Critics 
By 1948, South Korean students seemed relatively pacified and the education 
reforms more or less in place. In other areas of culture, the USAMGIK made much 
less effort and paid little attention, and problems, although of a different nature, were 
also acute. A few Americans in the lower ranks of the occupation expressed their 
concern over these problems. One such person was Ely Haimowitz in the USAMGIK 
Department of Education. Haimowitz, a classical pianist trained at Juilliard, arrived 
in November 1945 to be the USAMGIK's advisor for music programs. He remained 
in this position until the South Korean Interim Government (SKIG) was created in 
August 1947 and then became an advisor on cultural affairs to General Hodge's 
Twenty-fourth Corps headquarters until December. Although Haimowitz was not a 
high-ranking member of the MG, he seems to have been the only officer with regular, 
sustained, and official contact with members of the Korean arts world, including not 
only Korean musicians but also writers and artists of various kinds. 
Haimowitz took to his task with evident enthusiasm. His main work initially 
was setting up music education in schools and for teachers. Greatly impressed with 
the talent and discipline of Korean musicians, he helped build up the Korea Symphony 
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Orchestra, the Korean Opera Association, the Seoul Symphony Orchestra, the Seoul 
Conservatory, and the first Department of Music at Seoul National University. 
Haimowitz also brought a Korean director and concert pianist to New York for study 
at Juilliard and tried to promote Korean music in the United States. His special 
passion, however, was the discovery and promotion of "native" music in Korea. He 
frequently went to the countryside in search of rural music, and beginning in 1946 
he promoted an annual farmer's music festival in cooperation with the new National 
Music Academy. 
Along the way, Haimowitz encountered numerous frustrations and obstacles, not 
the least of which was the arrogant philistinism of the U.S. occupation forces that 
was exacerbated by official occupation policy, which discouraged fraternization, 
forbade Koreans from performing in the "American" theater (which had been the best 
theater in Seoul before liberation), and did not allow Koreans to be entertained in 
American billets. Another of the more irritating obstacles was the Yi royal family, 
which treated its palace grounds as private property rather than public cultural assets. 
The main Seoul zoo, for example, was the grounds of Ch'angdok palace; when the 
USAMGIK tried to put it under the jurisdiction of the science museum, royal family 
workers refused to take care of the animals. As a result, Haimowitz dryly noted in 
August 1946 that "one hippopotamus, one ostrich and one camel have died" of neglect 
(Haimowitz 13 August 1946, 35). 
More serious was the effect of political polarization in South Korea on the arts 
world. Artists who were considered "leftist" were continuously harassed by the police 
and right-wing youth groups. The Farmer's Music Festival was blocked until the very 
last minute by Chang T'aek-sang, notorious head of the Seoul Metropolitan Police 
Department. Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of South Korean musicians, artists, writers, 
and performers moved to the North. 
By 1947, Haimowitz was quite disillusioned with the MG's behavior and policy 
in general and its cultural policies in particular. In 1948, he wrote a lengthy evaluation 
to the Civil Affairs Division bitterly complaining about the MG's myopic policies. 
While the Americans did nothing to help to train promising Koreans, Haimowitz 
said, "[t]he Soviets in North Korea make a policy of sending the finest Korean talent 
to the USSR" (Haimowitz, "Report on Korea" 1947, 41). Furthermore, Haimowitz 
recounted how the renowned modern dancer Ch'oe Suing-huii returned to Korea from 
Shanghai in the spring of 1946 and approached his department about help in starting 
a school of Korean dance.6 Receiving no response, a few weeks later she went to the 
Soviet zone; the Soviets sent her and her group to Moscow to perform, and on her 
return she was set up with her own dance school, the Ch'oe Suing-huii Studio, which 
remained the premier dance school in North Korea until 1956, when it was merged 
with the Dance Department of the State Art Academy to become the State Dance 
School (Han 1957, 18). Ch'oe was honored with the rank of "People's Artist" in the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK [or North Korea]), and her husband, 
An Mak, was also a prominent writer under the North Korean regime. 
Haimowitz felt as though the USAMGIK had squandered the friendship of 
Koreans in the South through its arrogant behavior and its alignment with a right- 
wing minority. He concluded that American prestige depended on the good will of 
ordinary Koreans and intellectuals, "not [on] the wishes of a few selfish Koreans power- 
hungry and anxious to maintain themselves at our expense-a group whose edifice is 
6Although Haimowitz here says that he met Ch'oe in the spring of 1946, his reports at 
the time indicate that they met in mid-June (17 June 1946). 
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bound to collapse upon our withdrawal because of its rotten foundations" (Haimowitz, 
"Report on Korea" 1947, 44). 
Active Propaganda Phase, 1947-48 
From 1946 to 1948, the U.S. treatment of information and culture as part of its 
foreign policy changed dramatically as the cold war emerged around the world. 
Congress reached a consensus in 1947 to establish a postwar propaganda effort. 
Psychological warfare, embodied in the Office of War Information that was abolished 
by President Harry S. Truman on 31 August 1945 (although it had never really 
disappeared), was revived. On the other side, the Soviets established the Cominform 
as a direct response to the propaganda success of the European Recovery Plan, or 
Marshall Plan, in Western Europe (Hixson 1997, 5-7). Culture, information, and 
academic exchange became new weapons in the cold war. This new cultural cold war 
took various forms, not necessarily linked to each other in an integral way: among 
the major landmarks were the Fulbright program, launched in 1946; the Central 
Intelligence Agency, established out of the wartime Office of Strategic Studies in 
1947; and the Smith-Mundt Act, passed by Congress in January 1948 to promote 
"mutual understanding" between Americans and other peoples in the world. The 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 led to the implementation of National Security 
Council Directive No. 68, which is best known for its recommendation to increase 
military spending massively but also called for a substantial increase in funding for 
information services (Foglesong 1999, 57). In 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board 
was created to coordinate activities in information, propaganda, and psychological 
warfare among the State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (Lucas 1996). 
The U.S. occupation in Korea reflected these policy changes in Washington. In 
mid-1947 the Office of Civil Information was formed as a staff section of the U.S. 
Army's Twenty-fourth Corps headquarters in Seoul, the counterpart of the military 
government's Office of Public Information (National Archives, RG 319a, 10). The 
United States Information Service (USIS) established an office in Seoul and branch 
centers in the provinces, beginning with Pusan in fall 1947, in Inchon and Ch'unch'on 
in January 1948, and followed by offices in Ch'ongju, Ch'onju, Taejon, Kaesong, 
Kwangju, Taegu, and on Cheju Island. Each provincial USIS center was to have a 
staff of ten to thirty Koreans and two Americans. Seoul headquarters would also have 
production units for motion pictures, exhibits, radio, and publication; a puppet-show 
unit was also developed in mid-1948. American-sponsored six-car "propaganda trains" 
traveled through South Korea in 1947 and 1948, reaching a peak of activity during 
the May 1948 presidential elections. The USIS began a mobile motion picture 
operation that was alleged to have reached every county in South Korea by mid-1948, 
although administration and equipment were poor. 
In preparation for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, the army turned the 
whole culture and information program over to the State Department on 1 January 
1949, and emphasis shifted from information to cultural relations through USIS 
programs. The Fulbright program, for example, was established in Korea in April 
1950, although it did not begin scholarly exchanges until 1960, due to the disruption 
of the war. Motion picture work also expanded, "but without adequate American 
direction," the U.S. military later complained (National Archives, RG 319a, 10). 
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Among the important "private" initiatives in film was the Protestant Audio-Visual 
Committee, led by Presbyterian missionary E. Otto De Camp, which was the basis 
for the Christian Broadcasting Corporation that was about to be launched when war 
broke out. 
Film would be an important part of the global cold war information program. 
American films had been shown in the U.S.-occupied areas on an ad hoc basis, but in 
the fall of 1948 the U.S. military began a coordinated program of documentary film 
production and dissemination for occupied territories. The Motion Picture Association 
of America (MPA) had sent representatives to occupied Germany and Japan, but the 
occupation authorities there complained that these representatives were "commercial 
agents, without judgment on re-education and re-orientation aims" of the military 
governments (National Archives, RG 319d, n.p.). For example, the filmJohnny Belinda 
was criticized by the MG in Germany for glorifying rape and murder at a time when 
war criminals were on trial and facing possible execution (National Archives, RG 
319d). 
To address the film needs of reorientation, the Motion Picture Program Abroad 
was initiated in September 1948. That month, Kenneth C. Royall, secretary of the 
army, met in New York with Eric Johnston, president of the MPA, to ask whether 
"the American motion picture industry could supply sufficient one and two reel films 
to meet the needs of reorientation and reeducation in these occupied or liberated 
countries" (National Archives, RG 319e, 1). MPA Vice President Francis S. Harmon 
analyzed all short films that had been produced since 1941; in October he wrote back 
with a suggested list of seventy-eight films, of which the MPA could supply half, 
with the rest to be produced by the Motion Picture Section of the U.S. Army to fit 
local conditions. "The entire film program overseas should present the American way 
of life," Harmon wrote, and he proposed that "a limited number of documentaries 
which deal directly with our basic institutions spell out in a manner quite unnecessary 
for American audiences, the successful operation of our democratic processes for 
Germans, Austrians, Japanese and Korean audiences" (National Archives, RG 319e, 
1). The program needed more films "which deal with the daily life and work of average 
Americans, the cultural and educational activities of American communities, music, 
art and religion, the manifold activities of women, and with the successful operation 
of our democratic institutions." The films should "avoid the flavor of propaganda" and 
present their subjects "in an objective manner designed to let the facts speak for 
themselves" (National Archives, RG 319e, 2-3). The films should be sensitive to the 
devastation and poverty of the occupied areas and "avoid picturing the United States 
as a land of abundance and luxury." Rather, they "should show the simplicity of living 
in the United States." The main emphasis of these films should be on democracy in 
action, "the grass roots pushing upward ... common men working in association to 
solve their problems, whatever their nature.... We should aim to show in each 
picture, in miniature, 140,000,000 people who live democracy in their daily action" 
(National Archives, RG 319e, 3, emphasis in original). 
Thus was born the Motion Picture Section (MPS) of the Reorientation Branch of 
the Army's Civil Affairs Division, which adopted the following as its statement of 
purpose: "The reorientation, reeducation, and democratization of the peoples of the 
occupied areas-Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea-through the use of effective 
film" (National Archives, RG319e, 3). Furthermore, the mission statement declared 
that "our initial reorientation task is to expose the essential falsity and depravity of 
police state ideology; to mirror for our audience the catastrophic results of this 
ideology for all mankind; and to rekindle a sense of moral responsibility in the 
79 
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occupied peoples." This was a program clearly designed for the defeated enemy states, 
Germany and Japan; Austria, which had voluntarily merged with Nazi Germany, 
might also be seen as a case of reorientation away from "police state ideology." But, 
how did this apply to Korea? If anything, a police state was emerging, not disap- 
pearing, in the form of Syngman Rhee's dictatorship in South Korea since August 
1948; if the reference was to the Japanese colonial police state, then the U.S. 
occupation had egregiously failed to remove the most active and notorious vestige of 
that state, the colonial-era police force itself. What Koreans were to be reoriented 
toward was clear: American-style liberal democracy. But, from what were Koreans to 
be reoriented? By fall 1950, the Americans would have the answer to this question. 
Up to 1948 the activities of the Motion Picture Section of the Office of Civil 
Information in Korea had been "mainly confined to [thel censoring and licensing of 
movies from South Korea, advising of Korean Motion Picture Section, Department 
of Public Information, and adapting of several American documentaries for Korean 
consumption" (National Archives, RG 319f, 1). With the new Film Reorientation 
Program, the MPS launched a newsreel series called Progress of Korea dealing with 
Korea-specific issues, starting with a newsreel on the United Nations Temporary 
Commission on Korea (UNTCOK); nine more newsreels came out in quick succession, 
including several on the South Korean elections. In fall 1948, MPS was producing 
one newsreel a week, some made entirely in Korea, others with sound recorded in 
Korea but printed in New York. As the Office of Civil Information described it, "the 
editorial intention was to report on film these events exactly as they happened utilizing 
the narrated sound track to point up [sicj the free and democratic principles being 
used, the genuine desire on the part of the American occupation to aid and strengthen 
the love of freedom and the wish for sovereignty on the part of the Korean people" 
(National Archives, RG 319f). The motion picture program was continuously plagued 
by language barriers, poorly trained technicians, shortages of supplies and equipment 
(16-millimeter stock ran out in April 1948, forcing the MPS to borrow from Japan), 
and, not least, the severance of electric power from North Korea in May 1948, on 
which the South had been almost completely dependent for its electricity needs.7 
South Koreans themselves had begun to produce newsreels shortly after liberation, 
although it took some time to begin the production of feature films. Film production 
after liberation was in a chaotic state. The Japanese had developed an extensive motion 
picture industry in colonial Korea, but it was run at the top levels entirely by Japanese. 
With the outbreak of the Pacific War, the existing ten private film companies were 
abolished and replaced by a single, government-run Chosen Motion Picture Company 
(Anderson and Richie 1959, 151). Although the Japanese left behind the film 
equipment, there were few trained directors, no producers to speak of, and a limited 
number of movie houses-ninety-nine theaters for a population of twenty million, all 
of which had been owned by Japanese before liberation (O 1949, 2).8 As a result of 
7Before the Korean War, some 90 percent of Korea's hydroelectric power sources were 
located in the northern part of the peninsula. For several months the USAMGIK and the North 
Korean People's Committee, the central government of North Korea, disputed the amount of 
payment the South owed the North for electricity transfers. The North finally cut off power 
to the South on 14 May 1948, throwing USAMGIK's economic reconstruction policy into 
turmoil. 
80 Yong-jin, a novelist and playwright, was from the North, where he was briefly involved 
with film production under the Soviet Civil Administration before migrating to the South. After the Korean War, he worked for the Asia Foundation's Asia Cultural Film Company, 
which established a film studio on the outskirts of Seoul. At the Asian Film Festival in 1956, 
the film of his play Sijip ganun nal (The wedding day) became the first South Korean film to 
win an international prize. 
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these limitations, some filmmakers returned to producing cheap, 16-millimeter silent 
films designed to be accompanied by a pyonsa, or "live narrator" (known as benshi in 
Japan, where the practice originated). Kinodrama, a combination of film clips and 
stage acting originally from Russia and introduced to Korea by Japan in 1919, also 
made a comeback (Lee and Choe 1998, 25). A number of silent and sound films with 
a nationalist motif emerged in those years and dealt with the lives of anticolonial 
patriots such as An Chung-gun and Yun Pong-gil. Most of these so-called liberation 
films, at least in the opinion of contemporary critic O Yong-jin, were technical and 
artistic disasters (O 1949, 2). Few survived the Korean War. 
The U.S. military government gave something of a boost to the Korean film 
industry at the beginning of the occupation, when the Army Press Department asked 
the Koreans to make newsreels (Lee and Choe 1998, 83). Many Koreans were employed 
in the Civil Information documentary program; after the creation of the Republic of 
Korea in August 1948, the U.S. Army moved its film operation to Chinhae, where it 
continued to produce Liberty Newsreels (Lee and Choe 1998, 96). The new Syngman 
Rhee regime had its own Office of Public Information, which produced government 
newsreels called Korea News. The Ministry of Defense set up a film studio in Pusan, 
and both the air force and navy had film units. Sin Sang-ok, who became one of South 
Korea's top directors before he was allegedly kidnapped by North Korean agents in 
the late 1970s, began his film work in the air force film unit (Lee and Choe 1998, 
100-101). Feature filmmaking had finally resumed by 1947, and in 1948 and 1949 
a number of films with anticommunist themes were produced. The most successful 
of these anticommunist films was Han Hyong-mo's Songbyogul Ttulgo (Break down 
the castle wall), based on the suppression of the Yosu Mutiny in 1948 (Lee and Choe 
1998, 87). Syngman Rhee even had a hagiographical film (Yi Sungman kwa Tongnip 
hyophoe [Syngman Rhee and the independence club]) based loosely on his early career 
as an independence fighter. Unfortunately, no copies of that film appear to exist at 
present. 
Like many other aspects of public life in South Korea, the film world soon split 
into left and right. Working outside of the MG-sponsored system, the left-wing 
Choson Film Unit produced its own newsreels and held film events in the months 
following liberation. While more conservative members of the film community 
complained of domination by "left-wing sympathizers and underground North 
Korean agents," (O 1949, 2) left-wing filmmakers and fans faced harassment by the 
right wing. The right-wing government that emerged by 1947 strictly censored film 
for both political and social content (abolishing kissing scenes from foreign films, for 
example-the opposite of U.S. occupation policy in Japan, which encouraged the 
portrayal of such behavior in films shown to the Japanese), and conflict over film and 
politics went up to the highest levels of occupation authorities. Indeed, the immediate 
cause for the closure of the Soviet consulate in Seoul by order of the USAMGIK on 2 
July 1946 was a dispute over Soviet film. 
The MG had suspected the Soviets in the American zone of espionage and 
agitation almost from the beginning, and despite much evidence that these activities 
were carried out by South Korean leftists without Soviet assistance, the MG blamed 
every strike and anti-MG protest on the Kremlin. General Hodge seems to have been 
particularly annoyed with the Soviet consulate's use of film for propaganda and 
profit-especially profit. In January 1946, the MG learned that the Soviet consulate 
was renting films to Korean theaters "on a commercial basis" and showing them 
throughout South Korea (National Archives, RG 338, 296). General Hodge informed 
the head of the Seoul consulate, Aleksandr Sergeivich Polianskii, that "commercial 
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ventures of such a nature are not deemed to be in keeping with the status of your 
office" (National Archives, RG 338, 296). On 22 February the Motion Picture Section 
of the Department of Public Information gave permission for the consulate to show 
three documentary films which all dealt with the defeat of the Axis powers in World 
War II;9 four other films, including Sergei Eisenstein's Ivan the Terrible, were denied 
permission to be screened (National Archives, RG 338, 298). Still convinced that the 
Soviets were abusing their films for propaganda and commercial purposes, the 
USAMGIK banned all Soviet film screenings in the American zone on 9 March. 
Finally on 27 April, General Hodge gave Polianskii his ultimatum: the Soviet consular 
presence in a zone of American military occupation was itself "highly irregular," and 
the functions of the consulate, beginning with its film program, were to cease 
immediately-unless the Soviets agreed to a reciprocal American consular presence 
in Pyongyang, where the U.S. had "important manufacturing, missionary, cultural 
and residential property" (National Archives, RG 338, 303). This American demand 
was deemed unacceptable; Moscow ordered the consulate closed in June; and 
Polianskii, his family, and his staff left by train for Pyongyang on 2 July. 
The Soviet Zone 
In Korea, as in Eastern Europe and Germany, culture played a much more central 
role in Soviet occupation policy, at least in the initial stages, than it did for the U.S. 
occupation policy. Soviet occupation authorities succeeded in cultivating support 
among local intelligentsia and dominating the cultural apparatuses to a degree their 
American counterparts often envied (Naimark 1995, 398). This partly reflected, of 
course, the state control of culture within the Soviet Union itself and its application 
abroad. In the Soviet system and its East European offshoots, culture was treated in 
a way similar to the economy, with centralized planning, explicit quotas, and warlike 
"campaigns" (Bahro 1981, 39). North Korea under Soviet occupation followed this 
approach very closely. As a State Department study of the DPRK observed in 1951: 
"[mlovie and theater attendance, the number of lecture meetings, the distribution of 
newspapers and books, and even estimated radio audiences were set forth in advance 
in the economic plans as production quotas that the responsible officials and 
organizations were required to meet" (Department of State [19511 1961, 92). 
This was the period of "Zhdanovism" in the USSR, with the cultural sphere 
dominated by the policies of Stalin's cultural tsar, Andrei Zhdanov, and "socialist 
realism" the dominant mode of expression. After a period of relative intellectual 
freedom that lasted less than two years, the North Korean literary scene would enter 
its own "Zhdanovist" phase of state-dictated socialist realism in spring 1947 (Kwon 
1991, 59; Myers 1994). 
The Soviet cultural presence in North Korea included the Soviet Information 
Bureau; the international book agency, Mezhdunarodnaia kniga (International book), 
which distributed Soviet books and journals in Korean translation; the Soviet news 
agency, TASS; and Sovexportfilm, a branch of the Ministry of the Cinema Industry 
(National Archives, RG 332, 18). Soviet theater, dance, music, film, literature, and 
art were widely promoted in North Korea. After the DPRK and the USSR signed an 
9The three Soviet films permitted were Moscow Victory Parade, March Toward Vienna, and 
Surrender Ceremony on the Missouri. 
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agreement in early 1949 on cultural exchange, North Korean dance troupes, literature, 
and arts were brought to the Soviet Union. Between 1945 and 1950, some seventy 
Russian and Soviet literary works were translated into Korean, along with hundreds 
of technical works, histories, scientific texts, and journals (Lankov 1995, 314). Russian 
was made the official second language of North Korea, becoming compulsory in senior 
middle school in 1947 and lower middle school in 1948. In 1949, English was 
discontinued and replaced by Russian as a requirement for entrance to Kim II Sung 
University. 
The main channel for cultural exchange between the USSR and North Korea was 
the Korean-Soviet Culture Society (Cho-Sso munhwa hyophoe), a branch of the Soviet 
All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS),10 which 
was established in North Korea in November 1945. Its flagship journal was Cho-Sso 
ch'inson (Korean-Soviet friendship). Cho-Sso munhwa hyophoe claimed a membership 
of 1.3 million in late 1949, making it one of the largest social organizations in North 
Korea, with branches throughout the country down to village and street-level pan 
(neighborhood) (Department of State [19511 1961, 110-11). A corresponding 
organization was established in Moscow, and in 1956 the name of the organization 
was changed to Cho-Sso ch'inson hyophoe (Korean-Soviet friendship society). Similar 
to the United States Information Service (USIS) in Seoul, Cho-Sso ch'inson hyophoe 
was designed to promote cultural exchange and propagate positive images of the 
occupying country. Cho-Sso ch'inson ran articles praising Soviet socialism and Soviet 
culture, as well as translations of Soviet works. The bulk of Cho-Sso ch'inson, however, 
was devoted to Korean writers and articles on North Korean political affairs, with 
Soviet-related articles relegated to the back sections (see figs. 1 and 2). One early issue, 
for example, begins with a lead article by Kim II Sung addressing Korean scientists, 
writers, and artists, and is followed by an article by Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik on the "historical 
development of democracy" (minjujuui ui sajok palchon) (National Archives, RG 242a, 
8-75). This was quite unlike the USIS journal Amerika, which consisted almost 
entirely of American texts in translation (see figs. 3, 4, and 5). Soviet cultural policies 
in North Korea, as the USAMGIK in the South grudgingly acknowledged, gave much 
more space and encouragement to Korean cultural expression-so long as it was not 
critical of Soviet occupation policies-than did similar U.S. occupation organs. As a 
1947 U.S. Army intelligence report explained: 
The Soviets have created considerable good will by placing special emphasis on native 
Korean culture. Drawing on their vast fund of experience in working with minority 
groups in the USSR, the Soviet advisors on cultural affairs have encouraged the study 
of native folk dancing, literature, and music .... This attention given to the national 
culture will continue to pay large propaganda dividends to the People's Committee. 
(National Archives, RG 332, 19) 
Like the Americans, the Soviets put a priority on reforming education in their 
zone of occupied Korea. Almost immediately, colonial-era textbooks were replaced 
with Soviet texts in translation. Dozens of ethnic Koreans were brought from the 
USSR in order to train North Korean teachers (Yang and Chee 1963, 127). In 1946 
North Korea and the USSR set up a program of sending 150 Korean students a year 
'OVOKS was formed in 1925 in the USSR, and the alleged success of VOKS in promoting 
Soviet culture abroad helped justify a major U.S. government-sponsored "cultural counter- 
offensive" in the 1950s under the auspices of the United States Information Agency (National 
Security Archives 1954, 4). 
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Figure 1. Korean-Soviet Friendship, journal of the sorean-Soviet Culture 
Society, January 1950. Courtesy of the National Archives 
and Records Administration. 
to the Soviet Union for three- to five-year programs of study, and by the end of 1949 
more than 600 North Korean students were in the USSR (Department of State [19511 
1961, 62). No less a figure than Paek Nam-un, the leading Marxist historian of the 
colonial period and minister of education in the first DPRK cabinet of 1948, 
proclaimed after a visit to the USSR in 1949 that Koreans must closely follow the 
example of Soviet education and study the "new type of Soviet man," paying particular 
attention to Soviet science, the "world's] leader" (Paek 1950, 3-4). 
An extensive school system was established within a year after liberation and was 
expanded further in the 1948 economic plan and the 1949-51 two-year economic 
plan (Department of State [19511 1961, 76). Schooling was to begin with five years 
of compulsory primary school (inmin hakkyo, or "people's schools"), followed by a three- 
year lower middle school, and then a three-year higher middle school. Graduates of 
the higher middle schools could attend technical college or university, including Kim 
II Sung University, which was established in October 1946; higher education was to 
be funded by state scholarships (National Archives, RG 332, 18). Two aspects of the 
new education system seem to have been particularly popular and stand in contrast 
to the more conservative education reforms in the American zone. One was that, in 
contrast to the elitist education of colonial and precolonial times, schools were open 
to members of all classes, giving preference to children of workers and peasants. 
Second, the regime made a concerted effort to attack illiteracy, promoting the use of 
phonetic hangul, instead of Chinese characters, and setting up courses to teach reading 
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Figure 2. Frontispiece of Korean-Soviet Friendship, with "Songs of Lenin" 
and Kim Il-Sung's New Year's Address. Courtesy of the National 
Archives and Records Administration. 
in villages, factories, and among the military (Schramm and Riley 1951a, 761). The 
regime claimed to have brought literacy to more than two million farmers by 1949 
(Department of State [1951} 1961, 76). Unlike in the South, education in the North 
was free at the elementary levels and heavily subsidized by scholarships at the higher 
levels. On the other hand, the propaganda content of education was high, and students 
protested the politicization of education numerous times during the Soviet occupation. 
The largest student protest was in the city of Sinuiiju in December 1945, which 
provoked a response from the Soviet and North Korean security forces that ended up 
killing dozens and injuring hundreds (Armstrong 2003, 63). 
In addition to the promotion of literature and the arts in a much more direct and 
proactive way than was done by the Americans in the South-we have already seen 
the case of Ch'oe Suing-huii, Korea's leading dancer, who was rebuffed by the Americans 
but embraced by the Soviets-popular culture and the mass media were important 
concerns for the Soviet occupation authorities. Mass media of the time included radio 
and, perhaps more important, cinema. Stalin had once said that "[t]he cinema is the 
greatest means of mass agitation. The task is to take it into our own hands" (Taylor 
1998, 49). Both the Soviet occupation authorities and the Koreans trained under them 
would take this dictum to heart, and cinema would play a key role in the political 
socialization of the DPRK. By the 1970s, DPRK cinema would even come under the 
close supervision and patronization of Kim Jong Il, the current North Korean leader. 1 
"For a more detailed description of the early North Korean film industry, see Armstrong 
2002. 
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Figure 3. Cover of USIS journal Amerika, captured by the North 
Koreans during the Korean War, and recaptured by the Americans. 
Note the Russian handwriting, which identifies the title of the journal 
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Figure 4. Inner pages of USIS journal Amerika, showing USIS offices 
around the world. Courtesy of the National Archives 
and Records Administration. 
The Soviets were much more generous than the Americans were in assisting 
Koreans in developing a local film industry, especially considering that nearly all 
colonial-era film equipment was in the American zone. According to the playwright 
0, who was active in filmmaking circles in Pyongyang at the time, the Red Army 
signed a film production agreement with the People's Political Committee of South 
P'yongan Province in 1946 and brought in film equipment and Soviet technicians 
(1949, 1). Offers of training and good wages drew many aspiring filmmakers from 
the South. In 1948 the DPRK established a film studio, eliminated the tax on movie 
theaters (something the South Korean government did not do until the late 1950s), 
set up a system of subsidized food and housing for Koreans involved in filmmaking, 
and sent many film artists to the Soviet Union for training. Evaluating film in North 
Korea in 1949, O acknowledged that "[a]ll production, of course, must always 
faithfully mirror the party line.... But within that BIG limitation, the quality of 
the product was and is good, and the output is steadily increasing" (1949, 2). 
What is striking about the "party line" in early North Korean films, however, is 
the degree to which Korean nationalism, and not pro-Soviet "socialist interna- 
tionalism," is the recurring theme. For example, in a 1949 issue of the DPRK journal 
Yonghwa yesul (Film arts), Kim U-song, vice chairman of the Ministry of Culture and 
Propaganda, wrote at length about the political importance of film in North Korea 
(see fig. 6). Although much of his statement on the nature of cinema reiterates the 
standard Stalinist approach to film, the content of Kim's piece-beginning with the 
title "Unification and Independence of the Fatherland and the Mission of Film 
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Figure 5. Inside back cover of USIS journal Amerika, with music and 
lyrics to "Oh, Susannah." Courtesy of the National Archives 
and Records Administration. 
Artists"-stresses nationalist themes over praise for the USSR. Similar to the other 
arts, cinema in the Soviet Union was the "pinnacle" of creative achievement, and the 
mission of cinema in Korea was to be an instrument of positive state policy under the 
"revolutionary guidance" of the Soviet cinematic model. Later in the text, the author 
claims that North Korean cinema had become a state product "under the guidance of 
our nation's heroic leader Premier Kim II Sung" (National Archives, RG 242b, 5- 
12). The political purpose of cinema was to fill the masses with patriotic fervor; Soviet 
cinema was the model, but Korean nationalism of a particular North Korean variety 
comprised the propaganda content. 
This approach is most strikingly evident in the first feature film produced in the 
DPRK, Nae Kohyang (My hometown), which was released in 1949 (see fig. 6).12 
Although the North Korean film industry produced fewer films than the South Korean 
film industry-a grand total of two feature films was made in North Korea before the 
Korean War, as opposed to some three dozen in the South-the technical and artistic 
quality of Nae Kohyang is arguably higher than that of any South Korean film of the 
liberation period. Nae Kohyang stars the leading actress of the colonial period, Mun 
Ye-bong, who had played the title role in the first sound version of The Story of 
12Early North Korean films are difficult to obtain, to say the least. I am grateful to Yomota 
Gorky Inuhiko of Meiji Gakuin University for giving me a video copy of Nae Kohyang from 
his personal collection. Several North Korean documentaries from the late 1940s were seized 
by American forces during the Korean War and are now in the U.S. National Archives. See 
National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 242, Motion Picture Films, 
Series MID. 
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Figure 6. Cover of DPRK journal Film Arts, special issue on Nae 
Kohyang, 1949. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records 
Administration. 
Ch'unhyang in 1935 and later was awarded the title of"People's Actress" by the DPRK 
government. Although the influence of Soviet cinematic technique is obvious in Nae 
Kohyang, the Soviets themselves are not even mentioned. 
The film tells the story of the founding of the DPRK through the experience of 
Kwan-p'il, an impoverished farmer's son who joins the anti-Japanese partisans in 
Manchuria in the late 1930s. On 15 August 1945, Korea is liberated-but not by the 
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Russians. An intertitle proclaims, "Patriotic General Kim Il Sung overthrows Japanese 
imperialism and liberates the Fatherland." Kwan-p'il joins the new regime in 
Pyongyang and becomes a cadre in the Korean Workers' Party, even meeting Kim II 
Sung himself, who is shown in brief documentary clips. Finally, dressed smartly in a 
cadre's suit, Kwan-p'il returns to his hometown as a government official. There he is 
greeted by a crowd of welcoming villagers and is emotionally reunited with his ecstatic 
mother and his village sweetheart, Ok-tan, played by Mun Ye-bong. The last words 
of the film praise the "gift" of land that Kim Il Sung has given to the peasants of 
Korea: 
Ok-tan: Oh-General Kim II Sung has given the land to our peasants. 
Kwan-p'il: Yes. From now on, the land belongs to the peasants forever. 
Nae Kohyang is a remarkable encapsulation of the fundamental myths that would 
shape the DPRK's image of itself for decades to come. It is nationalist state propaganda 
in the form of a technically and artistically sophisticated (for its time and place) feature 
film. North Korea, we are told, was not founded under the auspices of the Soviet Red 
Army but is the legitimate product of a revolutionary, anticolonial armed struggle 
led by Kim II Sung in Manchuria. This collapse of class struggle into anticolonial 
national struggle, and the embodiment of that struggle in the person of Kim II Sung 
in his role as an anti-Japanese resistance leader, foreshadowed by some two decades 
the central theme of the "juche cinema" of the late 1960s and after (Kim 1996).13 
In many ways, Nae Kohyang is a more successful film than its counterparts in the 
South, the patriotic "liberation films." Or at least, this is how it would appear from 
what we know secondhand-few of the South Korean films have survived. South 
Korean film lore would suggest, for example, that Yi Sungman kwa Tongnip hyophoe, 
which attempts to create a filmic hagiography of former South Korean president 
Syngman Rhee in much the same way that Nae Kohyang glorifies Kim II Sung, was 
an artistic disaster best left forgotten. In the microcosmic cultural cold war emerging 
between South and North Korea, the North concentrated its cultural and economic 
resources far more directly on the "struggle for the hearts and minds of the people" 
than did the South. Within a year of Nae Kohyang's release, howeyer, the North-South 
political competition would erupt into a brutal fratricidal war that would draw in 
both the U.S. and China. 
War and Occupation 
The Korean People's Army (KPA) struck south across the thirty-eighth parallel 
on 25 June 1950. The KPA included hundreds of "cultural officers" who attempted 
to reconstruct the educational and cultural system in the South along North Korean 
lines. The political, economic, social, and cultural transformation of the previous five 
years in the North was instituted in one stroke, over a matter of three months, in the 
KPA-occupied South. When General Douglas MacArthur led the UN forces against 
the North Koreans and then across the thirty-eighth parallel in September and early 
October, a countervailing transformation was then imposed on the North. This 
military conquest of a communist society was a unique experience in the history of 
3Juche, usually translated as "self-reliance," was the highly nationalistic and even autarkic 
ideology that became the DPRK's "ruling principle" of politics, as well as culture, in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. It was very closely associated with the "cult" that burgeoned at that time of Kim II Sung and his family. 
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Table 1. Support for North Korean Regime, 1946-50 
Percent support for 
North Korean regime 
Group 1946 1950 
Factory and Common Laborers 60 50 
Farmers 70 30 
Students ? 70 
Source: National Archives, RG 497, 2. 
the cold war in every respect, not least of which was the opportunity to reform the 
minds of a population "brainwashed" by communist propaganda. 
The U.S.-UN-ROK occupation of North Korea from early October to late 
November 1950 offered an unprecedented opportunity for Americans to study the 
"psychology of communism." In October-November 1950, the United States Air 
Force commissioned a psychological study of refugees from North Korea and South 
Koreans who had lived through the ninety-day communist occupation of the South. 
The study concluded that the communist "monopoly of information" had been "at 
least 90% effective" (Schramm and Riley 1951a, 765; Schramm and Riley 1951b). 
Nevertheless, there were "cracks" in this monolithic information control: people had 
secretly listened to radio broadcasts from the South; rumors from the outside spread 
through well-established networks of friends, relatives, and neighbors; even if active 
resistance was minimal, there were those who quietly refused to believe the 
propaganda. 
After five years of a highly compressed revolutionary experience in society, 
economy, politics, and culture, enthusiasm for the North Korean system had already 
begun to wane. According to interviews with North Korean residents conducted by 
U.S. military personnel during the UN occupation, mainly in the areas of Wonsan 
and Hungnam on the east coast, support for the communists had fallen most sharply 
among the peasants, who had originally been the greatest beneficiaries of the reforms 
(National Archives, RG 497, 2-5). Although the numbers may reflect more the U.S. 
military's obsession with quantification than they do observable reality, these 
interviews with North Korean residents in order to determine their attitudes toward 
the UN forces do suggest the varying degrees of disillusionment with the DPRK 
regime according to one's social group. Measuring from a high point of support for 
the regime around the time of the spring-summer 1946 reforms (including land 
redistribution to the poor peasantry), the following "disillusionment statistics" emerge 
(see table 1). 
Support for the regime had dropped the most among farmers. Among industrial 
workers, support for the communist program had lessened but was still substantial. 
Support was highest among intellectuals and students, both in North Korea and in 
the areas of South Korea that had been occupied by the KPA. The high degree of 
support for communism among educated Koreans was worrisome and meant that the 
reeducation of this group would need to be a priority if reorientation of the society 
as a whole were to be successful. The U.S. military was optimistic that the majority 
of students who opposed the UN intervention could "be swayed by deeds" and come 
to understand that "only by joining their new government [i.e., the U.S.-UN-ROK 
occupation] can they realize the Korea they all hope for" (National Archives, RG 497, 
5). Clearly a new kind of reorientation-something similar to the process still 
underway in defeated Germany and Japan-was an urgent task for the UN forces 
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Table 2. Reorientation Classifications for Occupied North Korea, 
Comparison of South Korean and U.S. Programs 
INFORMATION AND EDUCATION BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL 
DEFENSE, REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
"Plan for Information and Education Operations in North Korea," October 1950 
Ideological classification (in descending order of reliability): 
1) Patriots (political criminal; underground political worker) 
2) General people 
3) Communist sympathizers 
4) Communist indoctrinated one 
5) Communist soldiers and policeman 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
"Reorientation Plan for Korea," November 1950 
Ideological classification ("with overlappings and shadings between them"): 
1) Well-indoctrinated communists operating secretly or biding their time until 
circumstances seem more favorable to their cause. 
2) Thoroughly disillusioned former communists and communist sympathizers, relatively 
sophisticated politically. 
3) Those with grievances against the communist regime but not of enough political 
awareness to link their grievances with its ideology. 
4) Idealists favorably disposed toward democracy, although probably vague about its 
meaning, including many Christians. 
5) Conservatives clinging to ancient ideas and ways. 
6) Those who distrust and hate all non-Koreans. 
7) The inert, without interest in ideas and resistant to even emotional appeals. 
occupying the North, a task the UN command suggested had to be pursued in 
conjunction with, and was as equally important as, the military operation itself. 
The South Korean Department of National Defense first proposed a plan for "the 
conversion of communists north of the 38th parallel" in October 1950, an English 
translation of which the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea forwarded to General MacArthur 
in Tokyo on 28 October (National Archives, RG 319b, 1) (see table 2). The ROK 
plan called for a multimedia operation that would eliminate all visual and aural 
evidence of the communist regime in every province, county, and village. Propaganda 
units at each provincial seat would consist of two painters, two theater artists, two 
musicians, and one religious leader, and these units would make extensive use of 
strongly anticommunist refugees from the North. After the "cleansing and extinction 
of communist-inspired music," for example, "newly made songs, martial music and 
lyrics inspiring racial spirit" would be "propagated and publicized throughout the 
broadcasting system and various recitals, street marches and broadcast cars" (National 
Archives, RG 319b, 2). Individuals would be categorized according to ideological 
orientation and would then be reeducated: in descending order of political reliability, 
(1) patriots (i.e., political criminals, underground political workers), (2) general 
people, (3) communist sympathizers, (4) communist indoctrinated one [sicl, and (5) 
communist soldiers and policeman (National Archives, RG 319b, 4). "All should be 
tolerated but those who are the enemy of our race and who ran to the communism 
by his will," the plan stated, and "those who are tolerated should be persuaded to 
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make public his reconversion through the communique, radio broadcast, message, 
etc." (National Archives, RG 319b, 8).14 
The U.S. responded with its own, slightly less ominous-sounding plan for changing 
the hearts and minds of the North Koreans. American planners did not intend for 
Rhee's forces to reorient North Korean society on their own. Practically from the 
moment UN troops crossed into North Korea, U.S. commanders were concerned about 
the ROK's troops' de facto control of North Korean territory, which would subvert the 
UN command structure. In mid-October, the U.S. Army sent Colonel Alfred Conner 
Bowman, who had directed the postwar allied government in Trieste, to Japan to meet 
with American occupation leaders for a discussion of North Korean reorientation. 
Colonel Bowman flew to Seoul on 20 October 1950 and then to Pyongyang two days 
later, accompanied by the ROK's minister of education, the minister of welfare, and 
the minister of defense, as well as Ewha Women's University President Helen Kim, 
whom Bowman described as "one Madame Kim, a Columbia University graduate, now 
said to be Public Information Officer for the ROK government and, as I was informed 
later, a notorious troublemaker" (Bowman 1950, 7). 
By 29 October, Syngman Rhee was in Wonsan, North Korea, giving a speech 
that praised the defeat of communism and the unification of the Korean peninsula 
under the auspices of the ROK. The Americans, who on the whole were not terribly 
fond of Rhee and his abysmal human rights record in South Korea, had a different 
idea. U.S. military planners envisioned an American-run military government for the 
North, similar to the 1945-48 military government in the South or the military 
government in Germany. By the beginning of November, it was clear that General 
MacArthur-who opposed the term "military government," if not the practice-would 
oversee a civil administration in North Korea but, similar to the Supreme Commander 
of Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, would "play down the MG aspect and make it 
seem as routine as possible" (Bowman 1950, 14). 
In November the State Department, in consultation with U.S. military leaders, 
drafted a "Reorientation Plan for Korea"-all of Korea-which acknowledged that 
"we must admit that communist propaganda developed a certain degree of success in 
both North and South Korea" (National Archives, RG 319a, 9). The State 
Department's priority would be information, and the reconstruction of the educational 
system would be handled by the UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) as part of postwar rehabilitation. There was an enormous information 
vacuum to fill: the State Department's plan noted that "the North Koreans have been 
shut off from the outside world since 1941," when the Pacific War led to the Japanese 
blackout of Western news; the North Koreans were not even aware that the U.S.- 
not the Soviet Union-had defeated Japan in World War II (National Archives, RG 
319a, 7). Under such conditions "it may be assumed that among the uneducated 
people shut off from the rest of the world there has been a good deal of acceptance of 
the communist line" (National Archives, RG 319a, 10). Therefore, an extensive, 
intensive, and appropriate program of reorientation had to be implemented 
immediately: "The mistakes of the United States Information Service in concentrating 
on too sophisticated media and on the cities must be avoided," the State Department 
noted, and USIS should instead focus on popular media and getting its message to 
the rural masses (National Archives, RG 319a, 10). 
14Although I have not seen the Korean original, it is most likely that this term "recon- 
version" is a translation of chonhyang, or tenko in Japanese, which was used in Japan and in 
Korea during the Japanese colonial period for the conversion of communists and socialists from 
their leftist ideology. 
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The prime media of reeducation would be motion pictures, puppet and marionette 
shows, speaker programs, exhibits, and hangul publications. In particular, motion 
pictures "offer the best media for use during the short-term re-education period" 
(National Archives, RG 319a, 19). The USIS motion picture production unit in Seoul 
needed to resume operation, and the USIS puppet section needed also to "be resumed 
as quickly as possible" (National Archives, RG 319a, 17). A key role would be played 
by returned North Korean refugees, who were to be sent back to their home regions 
in order to give public talks on the evils of communism and the benevolence of the 
UN. The USIS would coordinate this program through the use of mobile propaganda 
units and the establishment of reorientation centers in Seoul, Pusan, Taejon, Taegu, 
Kwangju, and Chonju in the South, and Pyongyang, Hamhuing, Wonsan, and 
Ch'ongjin in the North. 
At the forefront of reorientation would be Christians, both native Christians and 
Western missionaries. The American authorities saw most Korean Christians as 
strongly anticommunist, especially those who had fled from the North, although 
perhaps a third of the Christians in North Korea had joined the progovernment Korean 
Christian Federation led by Kim Il Sung's mother's cousin, Kang Yang-uk. The State 
Department's plan was, in effect, to unleash the missionaries on North Korea. "As 
part of the program, missionaries should not only be allowed but should be assisted 
in reestablishing the large education and medical centers which were once maintained 
in the North," even assuming their old denominational geographical divisions: 
Methodists and Presbyterians in Pyongyang; Presbyterians in Sunchon, Kangye, and 
Chaeryong; Methodists in Wonsan; and Canadian Presbyterians in Hamhuing 
(National Archives, RG 319a, 8). Particularly important would be the Protestant 
Audio-Visual Community in Seoul, with its substantial equipment and experience in 
reaching the countryside. 
Although the people suggested to run the reorientation program at the center 
were all State Department and U.S. military government personnel, seven of the nine 
members in charge of field operations were "mish kids"-that is, children of 
missionaries born in Korea-including Horace G. Underwood of Yonsei University 
and his brother Richard, as well as E. Otto De Camp of the Protestant Audio-Visual 
Committee. The metaphors of religion and war, as well as the concerted use of 
Christian propagandists, gave the reorientation plan the flavor of a crusade: "Above 
all, those who direct the program must be adaptable and good Americans willing to 
tackle the work with evangelical zeal. Given proper weapons and adequate supplies 
and equipment, a few qualified Americans can accomplish a great deal in all of Korea 
and can lay a foundation which will facilitate the reconstruction and unification of 
the country" (National Archives, RG 319a, 32). 
On 27 and 28 November 1950, representatives from the State Department, the 
U.S. International Information and Educational Exchange (USIIE) program in Korea, 
the U.S. Armed Forces General Headquarters-Far East, and the Department of the 
Army met to finalize the reorientation plan. The group proposed an Information and 
Education Program that would be run by State Department personnel "but [was] not 
to be identified as a U.S. program"-in other words, it was officially to be a UN 
operation (National Archives, RG 319a, 32). A ten-man State Department team was 
ready to be airlifted to Korea around 1 December, in order to carry this out. On the 
one hand, the obvious model for the Korean reorientation, and the source of much of 
its human and material resources, would be the still ongoing occupation ofJapan. On 
the other hand, the task in North Korea would in some ways be far more difficult. 
For one thing, there was no private ownership of media in North Korea, and thus 
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private ownership and operation of newspapers and other media would have to be 
developed. For another, there was still a great distrust of Americans and ongoing 
propaganda being broadcasted from behind enemy lines to the North, as well as from 
China and Russia. The lack of material resources was acute, and much would have to 
be brought in from Japan. But, although onerous, reorientation was a priority "no 
less important than the maintenance of peace and order or economic rehabilitation." 
To begin with, a short intensive period of no more than twelve months of 
deprogramming would be implemented by forces on the ground, followed by a long- 
term consolidation and rehabilitation with the assistance of UN member states and 
international organizations. Priority would be given to visual media and to reaching 
the countryside. 
The U.S. was faced with, in fact, a triple burden of reorientation, and the 
American planners seemed determined to make up for the mistakes and shortsight- 
edness of the initial occupation of South Korea. The new reorientation plan sought 
to "[u]ndo whatever has been done to the minds of the people by the communist 
regime, the Japanese regime, and even the heritage of the pre-Japanese regime which 
stands in the way of their becoming adequate participants in an orderly, responsible, 
progressive and peace-loving democratic society" (National Archives, RG 319c, 1). 
This program was, to say the least, an ambitious one. It was, however, never to be 
put in place. On the very day reorientation plans were finalized, 28 November 1950, 
the U.S. Eighth Army began a headlong retreat south, in the face of a massive Chinese 
offensive (Stueck 1995, 128). Reorientation would have to wait. 
Conclusion 
The United States came belatedly to fight the cultural cold war in Korea, after 
recognizing that it might be losing the "struggle for the hearts and minds" of the 
Korean people to the Soviets and their North Korean supporters. The Korean War, 
and especially the U.S.-UN-ROK occupation of North Korea in fall 1950, offers a 
striking example of the transfer of symbols, methods, and mentalities of the antifascist 
struggle of World War II to the anticommunist struggle of the cold war. The 
reorientation program for North Korea, although never actually put into practice, was 
a blueprint for "converting" a populace away from communism in the same way that 
Germans and Japanese were supposedly being transformed from Nazis and militarists 
into peaceful democratic citizens. After the ceasefire in 1953, this experiment was 
halted in the North; but largely as a result of the Korean War experience, the U.S. 
would remain active in the cultural arena in South Korea, as well as committing itself 
to military defense and economic reconstruction. One could argue that in this respect, 
South Korea has been a significant success for the United States. Unlike many other 
countries in the developing world, the Republic of Korea remained almost free of 
open anti-American public sentiment until the democratic explosion of the 1980s 
(Shin 1995). Probably no other country in Asia-besides the Philippines, an outright 
colony of the U.S. for nearly half a century-has been influenced so deeply by 
American culture as has South Korea. 
In the post-Korean War period, the encouragement of pro-American, pro- 
Western culture and attitudes was carried out by a wide range of actors, including 
the U.S. government and its cultural agencies; Christian organizations (both U.S.- 
based and Korean); volunteer organizations such as the Boy Scouts and the 4-H Club; 
95 
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and private foundations, including Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and the Asia 
Foundation. The influence of American culture in Korea, however, is both more subtle 
and more ambivalent than the Manichean mentality of the cultural cold war would 
have it appear. As elsewhere in the world, American cultural penetration into Korea 
has always had its critics, even if they were relatively quiet in the years between the 
Korean War and the 1980s. The alternative to Americanization is no longer 
"Sovietization," but an assertive national culture; and issues such as the U.S. military 
presence in South Korea, the dominance of Hollywood over the local film industry, 
and unfair competition from American businesses have been the focus of intense debate 
and controversy over the past two decades. The emergence of South Korea as a major 
economic force under the umbrella of American military protection has led to a 
rethinking of the U.S.-Korean relationship at many levels, including the relationship 
between native Korean culture (however that may be defined) and an American culture 
that dominates the world to a degree barely imaginable in the early years of the 
cultural cold war. 
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